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Who are the ‘authors’ of free and open source software (FOSS) projects such as the iconic 
GNU/Linux operating system? How do FOSS programmers claim ‘authorship’ in their 
collaboratively created code through their licensing schemes (including the widely used 
‘copyleft’ scheme)? To what extent does this FOSS ‘authorship’ deviate from the late 
18th-century Romantic aesthetic that has purportedly shored up modern copyright law
1
? 
Have FOSS licensing schemes succeeded in carving out for FOSS programmers a unique 
legal persona that can be detached from the established software copyright?  
Compared with many scholarly writings on the legal enforcement of FOSS licences, the size 
of the legal literature tackling the above questions about FOSS authorship is considerably 
smaller
2. Dusollier observes that ‘[t]he author is barely mentioned in copyleft, despite playing 
a prominent role in the system’ and this marked absence ‘unfortunately conceals the 
importance of the author figure in the philosophical model of copyleft’.3 As all copyleft 
licences are also copyright licences in the first place
4, Dusollier’s observation tallies with 
Ginsburg’s worry that ‘the figure of the author is too-often absent’ in ‘contemporary debates 
over copyright’ and this absence may only lead to an incomplete understanding of 
‘copyright’s role in fostering creativity’.5 In the similar vein, the lack of discussion of 
                                                 
1
  For a definitive account of the Romantic-author vision and its lasting influence on modern copyright, see 
Martha Woodmansee, ‘The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 
“Author” ’ (1984) 17 Eighteenth-Century Studies 425-48 
2  For example, Dusollier’s attempt to link FOSS authorship with the postmodern aesthetic in a 2003 law 
journal article still remains arguably the most important contribution in the legal literature. Severine Dusollier, 
‘Open Source and Copyleft: Authorship Reconsidered?’ (2003) 26 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 
281-296. More recently, Mira Rajan has also provided her view on the issue. See, in particular, Section II (B) 
(subtitled ‘Free Software: A Practical Need for Moral Right’) in Rajan, ‘Creative Commons: America's Moral 
Rights?’ (2011) 21 Fordham Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law Journal 905-969, 936-45; Rajan, in 
an earlier article, has sketched out a few problems concerning programmers’ legal authorship in a general 
context. Rajan, ‘Moral Rights in Information Technology: A New Kind of “Personal Right”?’ (2004) 12 (1) 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 32-54, 48-49 
3  Dusollier, ibid., 288 
4  For example, the most widely used copyleft licence—GNU General Public Licence (GPL)—clearly 
recognises contributors’ right to assert copyright in their contribution. Preamble, GPL 3.0 at 
<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html> accessed 30 May 2013 
5  Jane Ginsburg, ‘The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law’ (2003) 52 DePaul Law 
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authorship in FOSS licensing schemes can also risk losing sight of the whole picture of the 
FOSS licensing jurisprudence. 
The main thrust of this paper is that neither the Romantic-author vision nor the postmodern 
authorless creativity is suitable for defining FOSS programmers’ authorial and legal 
persona(s). It is proposed that the issue can be better understood in the context of the 
computer hacker tradition
6
 that has had a lasting influence in moulding FOSS programmers’ 
authorial consciousness. Under this hacker tradition, FOSS programmers do not work as 
individualistic Romantic author, but they are practically minded ‘craftsmen’ who are steeped 
in software development as an engineering discipline. The creativity of these FOSS 
programmer-craftsmen is not just driven by a desire to express their unique individual genius 
personalities, but rather it is also sustained by an intrinsic enjoyment of making software as 
functional artefacts
7
. Their craftsmanship does not prevent them from claiming authorship, at 
both individual and collective levels, to their work via their licensing schemes. This 
re-examination will also call into question US copyright’s treatment of software programs as 
literary works but not utilitarian objects and thus shed some light on the mechanism of FOSS 
licensing schemes that are in themselves a product of the hacking tradition. 
In order to elaborate on the above argument, the rest of the paper is divided into three parts. 
The first part (Section 2) gives a brief review of the history of FOSS and how programmers’ 
moral right of attribution is situated in the hacker tradition. It also introduces a significant 
legal lacuna in Anglo-American copyright law, which fails to recognise software 
programmers’ moral right of attribution. The second part (Section 3) assesses the influence of 
the Romantic aesthetic in modern software copyright law. The Romantic author vision is then 
contrasted with two alternative theories of authorship, i.e., postmodernism (by Barthes and 
Foucault) and the ‘craftsmanship’ theory (by Richard Sennett8), the latter of which I argue is 
more appropriate to describe FOSS programmers’ practical mode of creativity but has been 
unfairly neglected in the legal literature. The third part (Section 4) explores programmers’ 
legal persona as shaped by FOSS licensing schemes, which attempt to create a private regime 
of moral right of attribution for programmers. It spells out the relationship between FOSS 
programmers’ ‘attribution’ right and the craftsmanship theory, which deviates from the 
mainstream doctrinal understanding of ‘authorship as property’ under US case law. The 
fourth part (Section 5) concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Review 1063-92, 1063 
6  For a historical account of the early hacker culture, Steven Levy, Hackers—Heroes of the Computer 
Revolution (Penguin Books, London 1984, 1994) 
7
  Software is both functional and textual, but current copyright law tends to emphasises on the textual 
aspect of programming. Martin Kretschmer, ‘Software as Text and Machine: The Legal Capture of Digital 
Innovation’, 2003 (1) The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT) at 
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2003_1/kretschmer/> accessed 30 May 2013 
8
  Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (Yale University Press, New Haven & London 2008) 
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2. A ‘Private’ Moral Right Regime? 
This section gives a brief historical overview of the development of FOSS licensing. It 
highlights the conspicuous absence of moral rights protection of software programmers in the 
Anglo-American copyright system. In order to fill this significant legal lacuna, various FOSS 
licensing schemes have incorporated an attribution requirement, whose prevalence has 
arguably created a ‘private’ moral right regime as well as a difficult puzzle to figure out about 
FOSS programmers’ legal persona.  
2.1 From the Hacker Ethic to Open Source: A Very Brief History 
The FOSS movement emerged from the computer-hacker community which was originally 
based in a few US academic institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) in the 1950s and 1960s. Early computer hackers dutifully observed their community 
norm known as the ‘hacker ethic’ according to which they were ‘actively willing to share 
technical tricks, software, and (where possible) computing resources with other hackers’.9 
This hacker ethic was carried out in full measure well into the early 1970s. Richard Stallman, 
who later founded the free software movement, recalls that when he first joined the MIT 
Artificial Intelligence Lab in 1971, he naturally ‘became part of a software-sharing 
community that had existed for many years.’ This software-sharing ethic, according to him, is 
‘as old as computers, just as sharing of recipes is as old as cooking.’10  
However, in the early 1980s, the rise of copyright control over software
11
 soon eclipsed this 
software-sharing hacker ethic and a lot of former hackers were hired by proprietary software 
corporations.
12
 Deeply disappointed by this shift, Stallman invented the very first ‘copyleft’ 
licence in 1985 after a two-year long dispute with James Gosling, who sold his version of 
Emacs to a proprietary software company.
13
 Note that this 1985 version of copyleft was 
written solely for the GNU Emacs programming editor. It was not until four years later that 
                                                 
9
 Eric Raymond, ‘Hacker Ethic’ in The New Hacker’s Dictionary at 
<http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/H/hacker-ethic.html> accessed 30 May 2013 
10
  Stallman, ‘The GNU Operating System and the Free Software Movement’ in Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman 
& Mark Stone (eds) Open Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolution (O’Reilly, Sebastopol 1999) 53-70, 
53 
11
  In 1980, the US Congress officially extended its copyright law protection to cover software programs. 
This is largely based on Melville Nimmer’s recommendation that software can be likened to literary works 
where copyright should subsist. See Anthony Clapes, Patrick Lynch, and Mark R. Steinberg, ‘Silicon Epics and 
Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs’ (1987) 34 UCLA 
Law Review 1493-1594 
12
  In around 1983, Stallman witnessed the gradual decline of the hacker ethic in the MIT AI Lab due to the 
propertisation of software. Levy, supra note 6, 419-427 
13
  Christopher Kelty, Two Bits—The Cultural Significance of Free Software (Duke University Press, 
Durham 2008) 188-199 
Zhu_The Undeath of the ‘Author’ (2014) IJLIT                               Page 5 
Stallman turned this Emacs-specific licence into a generic licence known as the GNU 
General Public License (GPL) that can be used for any free software project.
14
 The GPL 
guarantees its users four kinds of ‘software freedom’ as listed by the Free Software 
Definition: 
 The freedom to run the program, for any purpose. 
 The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs. 
 The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbour. 
 The freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements to the public, so 
that the whole community benefits.
15
 
The attempt to save and revive the hacker culture by using GNU GPL later went beyond 
Stallman’s own GNU project. In the early 1990s, Stallman was invited to give a public 
speech about free software in Finland. In the audience was Linus Torvalds, who was then a 
college student from Helsinki University.
16
 Torvalds was very intrigued by the idea of 
copyleft and when he released his fledgling Linux kernel program, he did not hesitate to 
license it under the GPL, which enjoined all contributors to share their contributions with the 
project. The GPL created a snowballing effect in the growth of the kernel, which integrated a 
huge number of contributions into one legally compatible collective work. It is noteworthy 
that Linux is not the whole operating system but only a kernel. It is surrounded by many 
non-kernel user-space programs to form an entire workable operating system.
17
 Stallman’s 
own GNU project has produced many widely used non-kernel programs, but its attempt to 
produce its own kernel known as ‘Hurd’ has not been successful. As the Linux kernel filled 
nicely into this gap in the GNU project, Stallman insisted that the whole operating system 
should be named ‘GNU/Linux’ instead of just ‘Linux’. This naming controversy is a good 




In 1998, the success of ‘GNU/Linux’ further inspired Eric Raymond—an ambitious hacker 
who disagreed with Stallman’s ‘free software’ puritanism—to coin the term ‘open source’, 
which signalled a new determination to integrate non-proprietary software into the 
                                                 
14
  This is GNU GPL 1.0 (1989) followed by GPL 2.0 (1991) and GPL 3.0 (2007)   
15
  Richard Stallman, The Free Software Definition (2013) at <http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html> 
accessed 30 May 2013 
16
  Linus Torvalds and David Diamond, Just for Fun—The Story of an Accidental Revolutionary 
(HarperBusiness, New York 2001) 58 
17
 The kernel is the innermost part, i.e., the core, of an operating system. Applications such as the compilers are 
user-space utilities that surround the kernel. See  Ellen Siever, Stephen Figgins and Robert Love, Arnold 
Robbins, Linux in a Nutshell, 6
th
 ed. (O’Reilly, Sebastopol 2009)  p.1;  Robert Love, Linux Kernel 
Development,  3
rd
 ed. (Addison-Wesley, Upper Saddle River 2010) p.4 
18
  Richard Stallman, ‘What’s in a Name?’ (2007) at <http://www.gnu.org/gnu/why-gnu-linux.html> 
accessed 30 May 2013 
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commercial mainstream.
19
 ‘Open source’ is a more business-friendly approach that asserts 
itself to be a software development methodology superior to its proprietary counterpart. It 
contains a detailed list of requirements known as the ‘Open Source Definitions’ (OSD) that 
all open source licensing schemes should conform to. The OSD not only addresses the issues 
that have already been mentioned in the Free Software Definition, but it also touches upon 
programmers’ reputation management in relation to their code. Section 4 of the OSD stresses 
the necessity to protect the ‘integrity of the author’s source code’. An open source licence 
‘may require derived works to carry a different name or version number from the original 
software’20 in order to distinguish the original code from the modified one. This is based on 
the rationale that open-source licences should play a role in protecting the reputation of the 
‘author’ of the relevant code: 
Encouraging lots of improvement is a good thing, but users have a right to know who is 
responsible for the software they are using. Authors and maintainers have reciprocal 
right to know what they’re being asked to support and protect their reputations.21 
2.2 Filling the Lacuna: The Prevalent Authorial Attribution Requirement 
In the spirit of Section 4 of the OSD, almost all FOSS licences require downstream 
distributors to retain the attribution information about the original contributors in all future 
public redistributions. Legal scholars have been well aware that there is a strong norm of 
attribution in the FOSS community, where licences are employed to make sure that credit 
goes to the right source. Fisk observes that ‘[a]ttribution is important to many participants in 
the open source movement, even though exclusivity is shunned’.22 In a similar vein, the Free 
Software Act (FSA) as proposed by the Free Software Consortium summarises the licensing 
norm of attribution in three points:  
 The author of any free software program retains the right of attribution to his/her 
work.    
 Any modifier must acknowledge the authorship of the original program and the 
authorship of the modification.  
 All authorship must always be correctly attributed.23  
                                                 
19  
Eric Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, 2000, version 3.0 at 
<http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/> accessed 30 May 2013 
20
  Section 4, OSD at <http://opensource.org/osd-annotated> accessed 30 May 2013 
21
  Rationale of Section 4 of the OSD, ibid. 
22
  Catherine Fisk, ‘Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution’ (2006) 95 Georgetown Law 
Journal 49-117, 89 
23
  Jaco Aizenman, Maureen O’Sullivan, Martin Pedersen, Pedro Rezende, Shilu Shah, Pia Smith and Jorge 
Villa, Free Software Act (Draft) (2004) 1 (4) SCRIPT-ed  
<http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/issue4/FS-Act.pdf> accessed 30 May 2013 
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The above list registers an obvious desire to build a fair and effective attribution system 
among FOSS programmers. If fully realised, it would amount to a regime akin to the Berne 
Convention’s moral right of ‘attribution’, which is also known as authors’ right of ‘paternity’. 
Strictly speaking, authors’ paternity right is independent from authors’ economic right of 
property, but it is a type of personality right. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention makes it 
clear that the paternity right is distinguishable from ‘author’s economic rights, and even after 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work 
[…].’ 24   On top of the paternity right, the same Article 6bis also names another 
non-economic moral right ‘to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or 
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour 
or reputation’25. This right is commonly known as the author’s right of ‘integrity’. 
One should not confuse the Berne Convention’s right of ‘integrity’ with the meaning of the 
word in the phrase ‘Integrity of The Author’s Source Code’ as referred to in Section 4 of the 
Open Source Definitions (OSD). Although the term ‘integrity’ is used on both occasions, the 
scopes of the two are not exactly the same. Under the Berne Convention, authors’ right of 
integrity is for preventing the authorial work from being distorted, mutilated or derogatorily 
modified. In contrast, FOSS licensing compatible with the OSD gives users the software 
freedom to modify the code in any manner, which may even include ‘distortion’ or 
‘mutilation’ of the code, so long as the ‘distorted’ or ‘mutilated’ code is not misattributed to 
the original programmers.
26
 Conversely, if a follow-up programmer makes good (rather than 
derogatory) modification of original code, FOSS licensing will also make sure this 
improvement is not attributed to the original programmers either. As Fisk observes: 
‘Although the explanation of the attribution requirements contained in the licenses are more 
focused on preventing wrongful attributions of blame than credit, presumably if a modification 
proves to be wonderful, the original authors will not get credit either.’27 In this sense, Section 
4 of the OSD regarding ‘Integrity of The Author’s Source Code’ is really about a right 
against false attribution, which is closer to the ‘paternity’ right than the ‘integrity’ right 
under the Berne Convention. 
Unfortunately, the paternity right under the Berne Convention is not directly applicable to 
software programmers, according to Anglo-American copyright law. This has created a 
significant lacuna that seems to be in need of being filled by FOSS licensing as a private 
arrangement of attribution.
28
 In the US, only visual artists but not computer programmers are 
                                                 
24
  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971 revision with 1979 
amendments) 
25
  Ibid. 
26
  Bruce Perens, ‘Open Source Definition’ in Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman & Mark Stone (eds) Open 
Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolution (O’Reilly & Associates, Sebastopol 1999) 171-188, 178  
27
  Fisk, supra note 22 at 90 
28
     At the moment, contractual arrangements seem to be the only basis of attribution in the Anglo-American 
context, as statutory law excludes programmers from moral rights protection on both sides of the Atlantic.   
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entitled to the moral right of attribution.
29
 In the UK, computer programmers are expressly 
excluded from having the right to be identified as author
30
, and this attribution right is only 
conferred to some categories of non-programming creators who affirmatively assert their 
attributional interest.
31
 However, the British copyright law traditionally gives authors a right 
against ‘false attribution’, which may still be applicable to computer programmers. This 
British indigenous moral right is not derived from the Berne Convention, but it harks back to 
the UK Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862, and has its reincarnations respectively in Section 43 of 
the Copyright Act 1956 and Section 84 of CDPA 1988.
32
 Lai argues that this right against 
false attribution is a historical ‘anomaly’ and that it makes little sense for computer 
programmers to have it without having the right of attribution in the first place.
33
 In 
comparison, US programmers do not readily have a similar right against false authorial 
attribution under their copyright law, but they may have an analogue trademark device to 
protect the authorial origin under the common law action of ‘passing off’ as codified in 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
34  
In 2001, the Lanham Act was successfully used to 
protect the authorial origin of a FOSS project known as ‘Coolmail’.35  However, two years 
later, the protection of the paternity right under the Lanham Act was put to an end by a US 
Supreme Court decision, which ruled that trademark law should not function as a kind of 
‘mutant copyright’ to protect authorial attribution in Dastar v Twentieth Century Fox.36 In 
short, although software programmers are classified as ‘literary’ authors under 
Anglo-American copyright law, their moral rights are not fully recognised. In this sense, 
programmers may be seen as a group of second-class authors under present law. 
To summarise, the prevalent attribution requirement of attribution in FOSS licensing, 
following the spirit of Section 4 of the OSD, has effectively mandated a limited
37
 private 
regime of software programmers’ moral right of attribution that has not been recognised by 
the US copyright legislation.
 
By doing so, open-source licences pose a real conundrum for 
lawyers to grapple with: do these licences really subvert the mainstream proprietary culture 
of software ownership or do they simply strengthen this culture by adding an extra layer of 
                                                 
29
  Visual Artists Right Act 17 U.S.C s.106A , 
30
  CDPA Section 79 (2) (a) 
31
  CDPA Section 77 
32
  Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, Mary Vitoria, Adrian Speck & Lindsay Lane, The Modern Law of Copyright 
and Designs (Butterworth, London, Edinburgh & Dublin 2000) 585-6 
33
  Stanley Lai, The Copyright Protection of Computer Software in the United Kingdom (Oxford & Portland, 
Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2000), 20 
34
  Section 43 (a) of Lanham Act is mainly used against misrepresenting the commercial origin of goods and 
service. However, it has also been successfully used to protect authors’ moral rights in the US. See, for example, 
Gilliam v ABC 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.1976); Follett v New American Library 497 F. Supp. 304 (SDNY, 1980) 
35
  Planetary Motion v. Techsplosion 261 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir.2001) 
36
  539 US 23 (2003), 34 
37
    This private moral right regime is limited in the sense that it only intends to protect FOSS programmers’ 
authorial attribution, but not their artistic integrity.    
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attribution right protection? The following analysis tries to show that the attribution clause in 
FOSS licensing is largely a makeshift solution or a ‘hack’ into the existing copyright law. Far 
from a complete overhaul of the law, this solution can be likened to a kind of software ‘patch’ 
created to fix a particular problem in a buggy system rather than devising an alternative 
solution from scratch. In this light, the attribution clause does not really weaken current 
copyright law, but the enforceability of the former relies on the latter. In fact, it will be shown 
later that, in judicial practice, the FOSS programmers’ attribution right tends to be aligned 
with copyright owners’ pecuniary interests as represented in the landmark ruling Jacobsen v 
Katzer.
38
 In Section 4 of this article, I will offer a detailed critique of the Jacobsen ruling 
from the vantage point of the craftsmanship theory, which proposes a moral right of 
attribution detached from the proprietary copyright system. Before unravelling this critique, I 
need to explain what is meant by ‘craftsmanship’ as opposed to the Romantic and 
postmodern aesthetics.  
3. Rehabilitating Craftsmanship: Authorial Personas of FOSS Programmers 
This section examines three authorial personas of FOSS programmers, under Romanticism, 
postmodernism and the craftsmanship theory, respectively. It first traces the influence of the 
idea of the Romantic author in software copyright law. This is then followed by a brief 
account of the postmodern critique, which declares the ‘death’ of the author. The analysis 
will show that FOSS authorship is driven neither solely by Romanticism nor postmodernism, 
but that it can be better understood under the authorial persona of ‘craftsman’, whose 
practical mode of problem finding and problem solving is completely in line with the 
indigenous hacker tradition of FOSS programmers. 
3.1 The Lingering Romantic Aesthetic in Software Copyright 
The individual ‘author’, who can be credited as the sole originator of a creative work, is a 
construct of relatively recent pedigree. It largely stems from the Romantic movement since 
the late eighteenth century when literary writers were elevated to the position of self-inspired 
‘genius’39. This elevation emphasised the ability of an individual writer who could derive 
inspiration from his inner mind rather than an external source such as God or a muse. 
                                                 
38
  535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
39
      Romantic authorship can also be seen as an aesthetical façade of authors’ legally enforceable moral 
rights as opposed to their economic rights. Historically, the Romantic vision plays a role in justifying and 
propelling the legal protection of authors’ autonomy in self-expression, however unsatisfactory this justification 
may be. See Christopher Aide, ‘A More Comprehensive Soul: Romantic Conceptions of Authorship and the 
Copyright Doctrine of Moral Right’ (1990) 48 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 211-28. For the 
historical context of Romantic authorship, see also, the discussion of the ‘authorship norm’ as opposed to the 
‘marketplace norm’ by Paul Edward Geller, ‘Must Copyright Be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace and 
Authorship Norms?" in Alain Strowel (ed.) Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1994) 159-201 
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Woodmansee argues that the rise of Romanticism comes with the suppression of the 
non-imaginative ‘craftsmanship’ element in the creative process, whereby the literary writer 
produces a special kind of private ‘property’ based on the expression of his unique 
personality. 
[Romantic writers] minimized the element of craftsmanship (in some instances they 
simply discarded it) in favor of inspiration, and they internalized the source of that 
inspiration. That is, the inspiration for a work came to be regarded as emanating not from 
outside or above, but from within the writer himself. ‘Inspiration’ came to be explicated in 
terms of original genius, with the consequence that the inspired work was made peculiarly 
and distinctively the product—and the property—of the writer.40 (original emphasis) 
The literary writer’s rise from ‘craftsman’ to ‘author-genius’ is sometimes likened to a shift 
from ‘mirror’ to ‘lamp’ as a consequence of the Romantic movement.41 The pre-Romantic 
craftsman is like a mirror that merely reflects the external world, while the Romantic author 
is like a lamp that emits creation like a source of light. A Romantic author-genius is 
distinguished by his ability to generate ‘original’ creation ex nihilo as exemplified by 
Wordsworth’s testimony that ‘[g]enius is the introduction of a new element into the 
intellectual universe […]’.42 The growing eminence of the Romantic ‘cult of the genius’43 
also had its repercussion in the development of modern copyright law
44
. It is argued that that 
today’s copyright regime is precisely built upon the cult of the Wordsworthian author-genius:  
Our laws of intellectual property are rooted in the century-long reconceptualization of 
the creative process which culminated in high Romantic pronouncements like 
Wordsworth’s to the effect that this process ought to be solitary, or individual, and 
introduce ‘a new element into the intellectual universe.’ Both Anglo-American 
‘copyright’ and Continental ‘authors’ rights’ achieve their modern form in this critical 
ferment, and today a piece of writing or other creative product may claim legal 
                                                 
40
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41
  Meyer Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and Critical Tradition (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1971) 
42
  William Wordsworth, ‘Essay, Supplementary to the Preface’, quoted in Woodmansee, ‘On the Author 
Effect: Recovering Collectivity’ (1992) 10 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 279-92, 280 
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 Tim Blanning, The Romantic Revolution (Orion Books, London 2010) 31-36 
44
  It is worth remembering that the birth of modern copyright, which is conventionally marked by the Statute 
of Anne of 1709, happens in the age of enlightenment, which precedes the Romantic era. Geller points out that 
copyright has historically been caught between the enlightenment value (also known as the ‘marketplace norm’) 
concerning the dissemination of knowledge and the Romantic authorship norm concerning the authorial 
autonomy of self-expression.  Geller, supra note 39 
 The relatively short history of FOSS licensing also reflects this struggle. The licensing terms that allow re-use 
and re-mix embodies the enlightenment value, while the attribution clause has largely reified the authorship 
norm.  
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protection only insofar as it is determined to be a unique, original product of the 
intellection of a unique individual (or identifiable individuals).
45
 (original emphasis) 
Now zoom in onto the more specific area of software copyright, where there has been no 
shortage of academic works that bear out Woodmansee’s worry about copyright law’s 
uncritical acceptance of literary Romanticism. Jaszi, a champion of Woodmansee’s thesis, 
observes that ‘lawyers and judges have invoked the vision of the Romantic “author-genius” 
in rationalizing the extension of copyright protection to computer software’, because software 
programs are ‘no less inspired than traditional literal works, and that the imaginative 
processes of the programmer are analogous to those of the literary “author”.’ 46  It is 
noteworthy that the main source that Jaszi relies upon to make his observation comes from an 
earlier article entitled ‘Silicon Epics and Binary Bards’ written by a team of IBM lawyers in 
1987
47. ‘Silicon Epics and Binary Bards’ straightforwardly likens software to the ‘epic poetry 
of the Information Age’48 and a programmer is correspondingly the ‘poet’ of his imaginative 
creation. Note that this programmer-as-poet vision is not preached for the first time either, but 
is derived from Frederick Brooks’s classical 1975 work on software design, which forcefully 
articulates a Romantic vision about software programming as a creative process coming out 
of a poetic programmer’s imagination: 
The programmer, like the poet, works only slightly removed from pure thought-stuff. He 
builds his castles in the air, from air, creating by exertion of the imagination. Few media 
of creation are so flexible, so easy to polish and rework, so readily capable of realizing 
grand conceptual structures[…]49 
Under this logic, software programming is by no means a mindless job but involves a 
programmer-poet’s active ‘exertion of the imagination’ that impresses his unique personality 
into the code.
50
 This view resonates strongly with the rationale behind the legislative 
extension of US copyright law to cover software in 1980 based on the copyright scholar 
Melville Nimmer’s recommendation to the US National Commission on New Technological 
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).
51 
 
It is worth noting that the influence of Romanticism has already been eroded in current 
copyright. It is difficult to have the Romantic persona to account for the whole picture of 
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  Ibid., 1584 
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  Brooks, Mythical Man-Month, 7-8, quoted in ibid., 1497 
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copyright doctrines, such as issues dealing with the actual length of copyright duration, 
collective works, limitations and exceptions.
52
 More specifically, the Romantic-author vision 
that treats software as the poetic expression of a programmer’s original personality can be 
subject to at least two strands of criticism. First, the Romantic view derives from an 
author-centred perspective where the programming author-genius is deemed as the sole 
source of creation. It profoundly ignores the other side of the equation which is software 
users’ contribution to a software product. Especially in a FOSS environment, this problem 
becomes quite obvious because all users are potential ‘co-developers’ who can participate in 
the collaborative programming process.
53
 Second, when the Romantic view is skewed 
one-sidedly towards the analogy that software programming is a literary expressive activity, it 
ignores the fact that programming is also an engineering discipline that involves making 
functional objects. In order to counterbalance this bias, it is also important to see software 
programmers as practical ‘craftsmen’ who make workable things that do not necessarily have 
to be a vehicle of expressing programmers’ personalities. As these two strands of criticism 
are hugely important to form a panoramic picture of FOSS authorship, I will deal with the 
first one in the context of the postmodern critique of Romanticism and elaborate in some 
detail on the second one in relation to the craftsmanship model. 
3.2 The Postmodern Critique of the Romantic Author 
Postmodernist critics do not see the author as an authoritative figure who can exert a total and 
despotic control over a creative work. Instead, the putative ‘author’ fades away after the 
creative process is instigated by its initiating creator. A postmodern literary work is in fact a 
discourse in progress and its future development is dependent on the participation of its 
readers. Barthes in his 1967 essay famously declared the ‘death’ of the original author. This 
metaphoric death reduces the ‘author’ to the bare status of a ‘scriptor’ who merely scribbles 
                                                 
52
  For a detailed evaluation of the lingering influence of Romanticism in US copyright, see Mark Lemley, 
‘Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property’ (1997) 75 Texas Law Review 873-906 
In particular, the declining influence of Romanticism is also shown in its presence in copyright’s dealing with 
collaborative works with multiple authors, which certainly goes beyond the Romantic solitary author model. It is 
worth noting that different terminologies are used by the UK and US copyright systems to describe collective 
works. In the UK, copyright subsists in ‘compilation’ (s3(1)a, CDPA 1988) as a type of collective undivided 
‘literary work’. Legal scholars such as Bainbridge believes that software is exactly such copyrightable 
‘compilation’ comprising many undivided components rather than a ‘database’ comprising separable individual 
components under the UK law. In the US context, the term ‘compilation’ has a slightly different meaning, 
because it also covers ‘collective works’ comprising separable works. 17 USC 101. In the case of FOSS, I am 
inclined to agree with Bainbridge, who argues that software is better seen as an undivided collective work (or 
‘compilation’ under the UK law), and I will show later in this article that the job of those FOSS project leaders 
is exactly to aggregate individually contributed code into undivided whole that can run on its own two feet. 
Bainbridge, Legal Protection of Computer Software (Tottel Publishing, Heywards Heath  2008)  67 
53
  Raymond, supra note 19 
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down the text but claims no interpretive authority over the text.
54
 Two years later, Michel 
Foucault, in an equally celebrated essay ‘What Is an Author?’, indicates that the ‘author’ in 
question may not be an irreversibly ‘dead’ corpse. Instead, the authorial death sentence is 
commuted to the so-called ‘author function’ which is employed as the ‘principle of thrift in 
the proliferation of meaning’.55 A Foucauldian author relinquishes the total control over the 
work, but he still plays a role in restricting the uncontrolled and free-flowing interpretive 
process that can be participated in by readers. This thrifty non-proliferation ‘author’ is better 
seen as an instigator or founder of
 
a discursive activity that may be further shaped by 
participation of readers and he shall have no monopoly on determining the final shape of the 
collectively produced creation. 
Despite the subtle difference between Barthes and Foucault, both theorists articulate a 
reader-centred perspective of literary creation in stark contrast to the author-centred 
Romanticism. Most interestingly, this reader-centred perspective has already radiated out into 
theorisation about FOSS production, where software ‘users’ take the place of literary 
‘readers’.  The legal scholar Dusollier argues that the practice of FOSS licensing has largely 
fleshed out Foucault’s postmodern production of the collective work as an ongoing discourse 
between software developers and users. These FOSS developers are ‘authors’, who 
consciously choose to use FOSS licensing schemes (especially copyleft) in order to give 
software freedom to their users. By doing so, they are effectively ‘authoring’ a Foucauldian 
collective work in the manner of conducting an open-ended discourse that allows 
contributions from users: 
      The author is not only the initial founder of a discourse and instigator of a creation of 
which her contribution is only the first stage. She is also the figure by whom the whole of 
the collective creation finds itself marked by the stamp of freedom. In the chain of 
contributions, of works which will come to add incrementally to the first act, none will be 
able to escape the refusal of intellectual property rights exerted in a proprietary and 
exclusive manner. Foucault’s desire for greater cultural freedom is brought to life in 
copyleft.
56
      
Furthermore, the use of FOSS licences not only marks a shift of focus from Romantic 
‘author’ to software ‘user’, but it also signals a different understanding of the concept of the 
authorial ‘work’. Under the Romantic aesthetic, a work published by the author tends to be a 
finished product that is solely produced and fully owned by its creator. In other words, this 
Romantic authorial work is an objectification of an author’s private labour, which may be 
                                                 
54
  Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’ in Image, Music and Text trans. by Stephen Heath (Fontana, 
London 1977) 142-148, 145 
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  Michel Foucault, ‘What is an Author’ in Josue E. Harari (ed), Textual Strategies: Perspectives in 
Post-Structuralist Criticism (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1979) 141-160, 159 
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traded as alienable commercial property on the market.
57
 In contrast, the postmodern 
aesthetic suggests that a ‘work’ is always a piece of work in progress that can be understood 
as an ongoing discourse. The postmodern work is started but not finished by its inaugural 
creator and it welcomes readers or users to make their contribution. So it is mostly likely to 
be a collective work that keeps evolving and expanding for an indefinitely long duration. As a 
consequence, it is much more difficult to commercialise a piece of ever-expanding 
postmodern work due to its lack of the sole author-ownership and discrete boundary. 
3.3 Engaging with the Code: Craftsmanship and FOSS Programming  
Compared with the author-centred Romanticism and the reader/user-centred postmodernism, 
the study of FOSS programmers as ‘craftsmen’ shifts the focus further to the work in itself. 
Here the craftsmanship ‘work’ does not just mean the literary expressive ‘work’ as dealt with 
by Romanticism, but it also refers to software as functional objects.
58
 The craftsmanship 
model urges researchers to see programming not just as a literary activity but also as a 
practical craft. Craftsmanship in FOSS programming is an important but understudied 
phenomenon. In fact, it was not until the recent publication of the sociologist Richard 
Sennett’s seminal book The Craftsman59 that the connection between FOSS programming 
and craftsmanship was rendered clear. Sennett, by searching a long historical development of 
craftsmanship since the Homeric hymn to Hephaestus (master god of craftsmen), finds that 
FOSS programming as represented by the Linux kernel project is a prime example of the 
modern-day work-centred craftsmanship: Programmers ‘who participate in “open source” 
computer software, particularly in the Linux operating system, are craftsmen who embody 
some of the elements first celebrated in the hymn to Hephaestus’.60 This is because Linux 
embodies craftsmen’s dedication to the quality of the work in itself, or in Sennett’s own 
words, it is ‘focused on achieving quality, on doing good work, which is the craftsman’s 
primordial mark of identity.’61 
3.3.1 Two Traits of Programmer as Craftsman 
Programming as a work-centred practical craft has two salient traits that have been ignored 
by Romanticism. The first trait of craftsmanship challenges a deeply entrenched bias that 
privileges ‘having ideas’ over ‘making objects’ in Western society.62 Sennett observes that 
                                                 
57
  Peter Jaszi, ‘Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of “Authorship” ’ (1991) 2 Duke Law 
Review 455-502, 471-480 
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  Recall that software is both textual (as in human-readable source code) and machine-like (as in 
machine-readable object code). See Kretschmer, supra note 7 
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      Sennett, supra note 8 
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  Ibid., 24 
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  Peter Dormer, ‘The Status of Craft’, in Dormer (ed.) The Culture of Craft (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester 1997) 18-19, 18 
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the historical trend ‘has drawn fault lines dividing practice and theory, technique and 
expression, craftsman and artist, maker and user’.63 Countering this trend, craftsmanship is 
against the arbitrary divide between the ‘high’ creative activity as conceiving original ideas 
and the ‘low’ creative activity as merely implementing those ideas. It is an attempt to 
reconnect ‘hand’ with ‘head’ by building ‘a dialogue between concrete practices and 
thinking’64 and thus rehabilitate the craftsmanship element that has been discarded by the 
Romantic movement.
65
 In the context of FOSS, the craftsmanship argument is in line with 
Steven Weber’s observation that FOSS is ‘first and foremost an engineering culture—bottom 
up, pragmatic, and grounded heavily in experience rather than theory.’66 This argument, 
when fully spelt out, may also provide useful ammunition to support some legal scholars’ 
proposal to replace the generic copyright law with a sui generis regime for protecting 
software as functional objects.
67
  
The second trait of FOSS craftsmanship is programmers’ dedication to the quality of their 
work for its own sake. In Sennett’s words, this dedication ‘represents the special human 
condition of being engaged’ and ‘people become engaged practically but not necessarily 
instrumentally.’68 The craftspeople’s practical engagement, in the computer hacker tradition, 
simply means the use of the hacking skills to take care of the created work. Burrell Smith, an 
early designer of the Macintosh computer, comments that computer hacking is not 
‘necessarily high tech’ but ‘it has to do with craftsmanship and caring about what you’re 
doing.’69 The hackers’ commitment to engage with or care about their creation does not result 
in the total ownership of the created work. Instead, it is more a matter of taking stewardship 
responsibility for software, which needs to be taken care of like a living object. In this sense, 
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a few leading FOSS programmers have already made a distinction between ‘ownership’ and 
‘stewardship’ in relation to their creation: ‘Ownership is something that is fully transferable 
from one owner to another without loss of values. [….] Stewardship, on the other hand, 
applies when something undergoes change, when it evolves, or when it has some kind of life 
cycle.’70 Most importantly, a carefully stewarded FOSS project is often cared by a small 
group of lead programmers (such as Torvalds for the Linux Kernel), and it tends to nurture a 
long-term collaborative relation. The craftsmen’s care by a core stewarding group of 




Furthermore, FOSS programmers’ stewardship responsibility to care about the quality of their 
work is also in line with computer hackers’ meritocratic tradition, in which a programmer’s 
merit is evaluated purely by the quality of his work rather than his personal attributes or 
social status. It follows the hacker ethic stipulating that ‘[h]ackers should be judged by their 
hacking, not bogus criteria such as degrees, age, race or position.’72 This meritocratic 
principle shows that the hacker ethic as a work-centred ethic is almost the opposite of the 
creators’ personality cult. Sennett observes that craftsmanship’s focus on the quality of work 
has an ‘impersonal character’, which can be rather ‘unforgiving’, but it is well present in the 
Linux community.
73  
This programmer-craftsmen’s favour of work’s quality over 
programmers’ personality is also corroborated by Eric Raymond’s observation of the ‘strict 
meritocracy’ in the hacker community, where ‘the best craftsmanship wins’ by the quality of 
the code in itself: 
In the hacker community […] one’s work is one’s statement. There is a very strict 
meritocracy (the best craftsmanship wins) and there’s a strong ethos that quality should 
(indeed must) be left to speak for itself. The best brag is code that ‘just works’, and that 




3.3.2 Differences between Craftsmanship and Postmodernism 
On the surface, the above two traits of craftsmanship seem to share a similar postmodernist 
urge to deconstruct the Romantic cult of genius. However, a closer scrutiny reveals that the 
craftsmanship perspective is also subtly different from the postmodernist critique of the 
Romantic author in two aspects. The first is about individual programmers’ motivation to 
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 Eric Raymond, ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’, (2002) at 
<http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/homesteading/homesteading/> accessed 30 May 2013 
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contribute to a FOSS project, while the second deals with coordination of individually made 
contributions into a functional whole. I will unravel each of them to show that the 
craftsmanship model represents an attempt to reconstruct, more than deconstruct, the role of 
individual programmers in FOSS collaboration as a cooperative craft. 
Firstly, for the postmodern critique, it is not entirely clear why individual rank-and-file FOSS 
contributors are motivated to contribute to a collaborative project. Postmodernists simply 
avoid asking what the motivational forces are behind individual programmers; they assume 
that the collective work is capable of organising itself automatically after an author’s ‘death’. 
(Understandably, there is no point in asking why a ‘dead’ author should be motivated.) In 
contrast, the craftsmanship model does attempt to provide an explanation about the motivation 
issue: programmer-craftsmen are primarily driven by their intrinsic satisfaction or pleasure of 
writing code for its own sake. Linus Torvalds famously names this intrinsic pleasure-driven 
motivation the ‘Entertainment with the capital E’ within the Linux community. 75 
‘Entertainment’ of code writing is believed to draw thousands of Linux programmers into the 
kernel project because ‘Entertainment is something intrinsically interesting and challenging’.76  
Torvalds’ ‘Entertainment’ as motivation does not cover every type of recreational activities. 
Rather, he sets limits on what qualifies, indicating that the ‘Entertainment’ should be linked 
with craftsmanship skills, which may be improved or perfected in practice. Examples of this 
kind of skill-based ‘Entertainment’ can be found in  ‘chess’ games, ‘painting’ or ‘mental 
gymnastics involved in trying to explain the universe’ and, of course, software programming77. 
Over the course of FOSS collaboration, Linux contributors are likely to improve their 
programming skills, and as a virtuous circle, when they become more skilled, they tend to 
derive more ‘Entertainment’ and thus do more programming.78 It is thus appropriate to see 
FOSS programming as an intellectual sport, where programmers derive satisfaction from 
coding just as professional athletes enjoy their sports: 
A very complex project like Apache or the Linux kernel brings the satisfaction of the 
ultimate in intellectual exercise. Much like the rush a runner feels while running a race, a 
true programmer will feel this same rush after writing a perfect routine or tight piece of 
code. […] The point is that many programmers code because it is what they love to do, 
and in fact it is how they define their intellect. Without coding, a programmer feels less of 
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a person, much like an athlete deprived of an opportunity to compete.
79
 
The second aspect of FOSS craftsmanship that is different from postmodernism concerns the 
coordination issue. Although the postmodern critique correctly points out that FOSS is 
collectively created, it does not further specify how the individually made contributions are 
actually integrated into a functional whole. For this reason, the postmodern critique has been 
accused of creating an imagined heroic ‘Romantic collective author’, who is no different 
from the subject it intends to critique, i.e., the Romantic individual author.
80
  
The craftsmanship model is different from postmodernism (or Romantic collectivism) in the 
sense that it does not assume that collective works can organise themselves. Instead, it 
believes that a core group of lead programmers’ deliberate efforts are needed to coordinate 
individually contributed code into a functional work. The annual reports published by the 
Linux Foundation since 2008 have consistently shown that the Linux kernel project is 
coordinated or stewarded by a small number of lead developers (known as the subsystem 
maintainers), who play a crucial role in integrating a huge number of contributions into final 
releases. This team of maintainers are quite like academic journals’ editors or peer-reviewers 
who act as communities’ gatekeepers. They are responsible for vetting and testing all 
submitted patches, which may be either rejected or approved into the mainline kernel.
81
 This 
review process reflects Linux’s practical need for quality control of their collective work and 
it has little to do with the expression of individual programmers’ unique personalities. Kelty 
illustrates how the Linux maintainers led by Torvalds do their daily job to coordinate 
individuals’ programming virtuosity into a collective functional work: 
Almost all of the decisions made by Torvalds and lieutenants were of a single kind: 
whether or not to incorporate a piece of code submitted by a volunteer. Each such 
decision was technically complex: insert the code, recompile the kernel, test to see if it 
works or if it produces any bugs, decide whether it is worth keeping, issue a new version 
with a log of the changes that were made. Although the various official leaders were 
given the authority to make such changes, coordination was still technically informal. 
Since they were all working on the same complex technical object, one person (Torvalds) 
ultimately needed to verify a final version, containing all the subparts, in order to make 
sure that it worked without breaking.
82
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It is not difficult to find that Torvalds and his fellow subsystem maintainers’ review work 
hardly amounts to the level of Wordsworthian ‘originality’ that generates absolutely new 
things ex nihilo. Instead, their job is about testing and combining other people’s contributions 
and thus much more mundane than expressing their own imaginative personalities. However, 
it is still nonetheless a job of critical importance for the purpose of making a functional 
software object that can technologically stand by itself. This responsibility to review 
reinforces the two traits of craftsmanship as mentioned above. First, the review process 
reflects the first trait of craftsmanship, which seeks to build a dialogue between concrete 
practice and thinking—between that of ‘hand’ and ‘head’—in collaborative programming 
activities. To test and then possibly integrate a submitted patch into the final project is largely 
a practical exercise of trial and error. This is a process where individually composed code is 
vetted against a practical criterion: whether it works with the rest of the software system as a 
whole. To implement an idea
83
 into the final collective software work is as significant as to 
conceive that initial idea at the individual level. In other words, the final review process is 
exactly where the practical ‘hand’ element in craftsmanship reaches parity with the rarefied 
‘head’ element when a programming idea is first conceived.  
Secondly, the coordination process that involves Torvalds and his fellow-reviewers is also a 
matter of quality control, which aims to weed out the bad code and retain the good one for the 
collective work. It reflects FOSS programmer-craftsmen’s second trait, which is their 
dedication to the quality of the work for its own sake.
84
 The way that FOSS programmers 
measure and monitor the quality of software patches for their project bears a strong 
resemblance to the peer review process in the scientific community, which also deeply cares 
about the quality of its work. It is in line with at least two of the norms identified in Robert 
Merton’s scientific ethos.85 One is the norm of ‘universalism’ and the other the norm of 
‘organised scepticism’. The former judges the merit of a piece of scientific work on 
‘preestablished impersonal criteria’ 86 , while the latter is ‘a methodological and an 
institutional mandate’ 87  necessary for verifying scientific claims’ validity through the 
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self-checking mechanism of peer review. The two norms point in the same direction of 
building a meritocratic system that focuses on the quality
88
 of scientific work without relying 
on certain individuals’ genius status. 
To summarise, under the craftsmanship model, individual programmers are real human 
creators who are motivated by the intrinsic pleasure of coding. At the same time, a small 
group of lead programmers undertake extra responsibility to coordinate individually 
submitted code into a collective executable program. In contrast, a postmodern software 
project seems to
 
disown its individual authors after the code is written, based on the assumption 
that individually contributed code may automatically aggregate into a functional whole. In fact, 
without the coordination by a core group of lead programmers, this kind of postmodern 
‘authorless’ work may well be a collection of unrelated software fragments that would fall 
apart in the end. In short, the craftsmanship approach has at least two advantages over 
postmodernism in explaining FOSS authorship. First, it explains individual rank-and-file 
programmers’ motivation as craftsmen’s enjoyment of coding for its own sake. Postmodernism 
avoids dealing with this ‘motivation’ issue, while the craftsmanship theory tackles it head-on. 
Second, individually contributed lines of code cannot be used straight away, but it needs to be 
aggregated into a functional whole coordinated by lead FOSS programmers. Postmodernist 
thought seems to imply that creative works are self-organised without conscious efforts of 
coordination. The craftsmanship theory gives full recognition to the authorial role of a small 
group of lead programmers (such as Linus Torvalds or Richard Stallman) for their stewardship 
responsibility in coordinating a project as a whole. This coordination effort is perfectly in line 
with programmer-craftsmen’s dedication to the quality of their work. 
3.4 Intermediate Conclusion: Why Does Craftsmanship Matter? 
The above discussion has surveyed three authorial personas that may be possibly assumed by 
FOSS programmers. The craftsmanship approach, which is championed by this article, has at 
least two layers of significance. First, it is more direct and accurate in describing FOSS 
programmers’ authorial persona from their indigenous hacker tradition. It does not have to 
stretch the Romantic or postmodern aesthetic, which is originally developed in literary and 
artistic criticism. Second, the craftsmanship theory can also build a conceptual bridge, from 
programmers’ ‘authorial’ persona, towards their corresponding ‘legal’ persona as constructed 
through FOSS licensing schemes.  As the first layer has just been discussed above, I will 
now move onto the second layer, which deals with the legal persona marked by the prevalent 
authorial attribution licensing requirement in the following section. 
 
4. Re-inventing the Legal Persona for FOSS Authorship 
                                                 
88
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This section deals with programmers’ legal persona as manifested through FOSS licensing 
schemes. FOSS programmers’ legal persona would appear to be neither a direct translation of 
literary Romanticism nor that of the postmodern authorless creativity. On the one hand, it 
does not fit with the lone Romantic author because FOSS licensing does welcome users to 
modify and redistribute the original author’s creation. On the other hand, postmodernism 
cannot explain the ubiquitous ‘attribution’ clause in FOSS licensing whereby licensees are 
required to credit the creators of the relevant code. Again, this attribution requirement seems 
to be better explained under the quality-centred craftsmanship model: in a meritocratic FOSS 
community, programmers are assessed by the quality of their work, while an attribution 
system plays precisely the necessary role in linking FOSS programmers’ names with the 
relevant code. The craftsmanship theory will eventually lead to a normative call for a limited 
moral right regime recognising programmers’ attribution right for its own sake, which should 
be detached from an economically minded proprietary copyright system.
89
 
4.1 Jacobsen v Katzer: Failure to Depart from ‘Authorship as Property’ 
To build an authorial link between programmers and code under FOSS licensing is important 
in two important aspects. First, it gives benefit, such as reputational gains, to programmers 
who contribute the code. Second, it shows programmers’ willingness to take responsibility 
for making work that guarantees software freedom. These two aspects respectively 
correspond to two different schools of thought about the nature of authorial attribution. One 
treats attribution as an economic benefit derived from programmers’ work as private property, 
while the other treats attribution as a badge of authorial responsibility for taking 
craftsmanship care of the code. In the following analysis, I use ‘authorship as property’ as a 
shorthand for the first school and ‘authorship as responsibility’ for the second. I will show 
that the landmark ruling in Jacobsen v Katzer is skewed towards ‘authorship as property’ but 
ignores ‘authorship as responsibility’, the latter of which can be equally crucial to the success 
of FOSS collaboration based on the craftsmanship model. 
Although US copyright law has largely failed to reproduce a Berne-type attribution regime to 
protect programmers, this lacuna
90
 may be filled by private property licensing schemes made 
by programmers wearing the legal persona of copyright owner of the software code. This has 
been essentially achieved, through FOSS licensing schemes, by having programmers’ 
attribution right ride on the proprietary interests as owned by FOSS developers. Lastowka 
argues that US copyright only recognises authors’ attribution right ‘in a collateral fashion’, 
which protects ‘works of creative authorship as property’ through the copyright licensing 
mechanism: 
It might be argued that copyright protects attribution in a collateral fashion. By 
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protecting works of creative authorship as property, copyright enables the contractual 
protection of attribution. If an author can control the dissemination and reproduction of 
her work pursuant to copyright law, copyright law will grant her the contractual leverage 
to protect her attribution interests.
91
 (emphasis added) 
The above paragraph precisely articulates what I have called ‘authorship-as-property’ 
approach to programmers’ paternity right under current US law. In other words, although 
attribution is not directly protected for its own sake under copyright legislation, it is disguised 
as a proprietary interest of the author-owner through a licensing scheme. 
The possibility of securing collateral protection of authorial attribution as property has been 
recently vindicated in the landmark FOSS licensing case Jacobsen v Katzer.
92
 This case 
involves a dispute over a FOSS project known as ‘Java Model Railroad Interface’ (JMRI) led 
by Professor Robert Jacobsen, who is a Berkeley physicist by profession and a model train 
hobbyist in his spare time. The JMRI code under dispute was then released under Artistic 
License (AL) 1.0. It is generally believed that AL has effectively created a private regime of 
droit moral enabling JMRI developers to have wider authorial control than allowed under the 
statutory language of the US copyright law. The Preamble of AL1.0 makes no effort to 
conceal this intent: ‘The intent of [AL] is to state the conditions under which a Package may 
be copied, such that the Copyright Holder maintains some semblance of artistic control over 
the development of the package […]’.93 (emphasis added) Fabricius comments that ‘the 
essential novelty’ of AL lies precisely in its ‘granting the author more attribution and creative 
control than would be granted in the ordinary case of a copyright license to copy, distribute, 
and prepare derivative works’.94 In this way, JMRI programmers are given ‘a private moral 
right’ that is akin to Section 106A of the US Visual Artists Right Act providing attribution 
right to certain visual artists.
95
 
The actual dispute in Jacobsen revolves around a program called DecoderPro, which is a 
sub-project of the JMRI. In September 2006, the JMRI developers discovered that Matthew 
Katzer had copied and modified some DecoderPro files into his own proprietary product. At 
the same time Katzer deliberately removed the following information that would have 
identified JMRI contributors as authors of their code: 
 the authors’ names  
 JMRI copyright notices  
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 references to the COPYING file  
 and identification of SourceForge or JMRI as the original source of the definition files, 
and  




Katzer did not dispute his act of copying, but he contended that non-attribution of JMRI 
authors was not a cause of action under the US copyright law. So the difficult question is 
whether Katzer’s act of deleting attribution information would lead to the infringement of the 
copyright of DecoderPro software. The trial court took the view that the attribution 
requirement was merely a contractual covenant, the breach of which is not a copyright 
infringement as such: ‘The condition that the user insert a prominent notice of attribution 
does not limit the scope of the license’ and it ‘does not create liability for copyright 
infringement where it would not otherwise exist.’97  
Failing to get an injunction from the trial court, Jacobsen then appealed the case to the US 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), which reversed the trial court ruling by 
arguing that attribution of JMRI developers is a crucial condition for the public to use their 
copyrighted FOSS code in the first place. The failure to fulfil this condition would lead to 
infringement of copyright and thus give rise to the remedy of injunctive relief against the 
breacher. Most interestingly, the CAFC does not straightforwardly enforce JMRI authors’ 
attribution for its own sake, but it unsurprisingly adopts the ‘authorship-as-property’ strategy 
through two steps. The first step denies that the case involves an ‘attribution’ dispute per se: 
‘Open source licensing restrictions are easily distinguished from mere “author attribution” 
cases. Copyright law does not automatically protect the rights of authors to credit for 
copyrighted materials.’ 98  The second step dresses up the attribution requirement as a 
property claim
99
 that furthers copyright owners’ economic rights under the licensing 
conditions: 
The clear language of the Artistic License creates conditions to protect the economic 
rights at issue in the granting of a public license. These conditions govern the rights to 
modify and distribute the computer programs and files included in the downloadable 
software package. The attribution and modification transparency requirements directly 
serve to drive traffic to the open source incubation page and to inform downstream users 
of the project, which is a significant economic goal of the copyright holder that the law 
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will enforce.
100
 (emphasis added) 
Although Jacobsen, as the first Anglo-American ruling that affirms the enforceability of a 
leading FOSS licence, is commendable in many ways
101 , CAFC’s overly economic 
interpretation of the case may also attract at least two types of criticism. The first criticises 
CAFC for making no real break from established proprietary information product licensing 
jurisprudence as started by law-and-economics judge Easterbrook over a decade before.
102
 
The second possible criticism is that the Jacobsen ruling is a missed opportunity to apply the 
craftsmanship theory in explaining FOSS programmers’ legal persona. As the first criticism 
has been recently discussed in the legal literature
103
, I will focus only on the second criticism, 
which is essentially a normative call from the craftsmanship model to recognise the FOSS 
programmers’ pride of doing their job well for its own sake independent from economically 
motivated incentives. 
4.2 Crafting Stewardship: A Normative Call for ‘Authorship as Responsibility’ 
The craftsmanship model argues that attribution is not just a matter of authors’ privately 
owned ‘property’, but is also deeply connected with their stewardship ‘responsibility’ to take 
care of the code in their craftsman persona. Again, in order to spell out this 
‘authorship-as-responsibility’ argument, there are two significant issues worthy of attention 
in the context of the Jacobsen case. One concerns programmers’ motivation (especially in 
terms of the reputational motivation that is linked with attribution) and the other concerns the 
coordination of individual contributions into a whole project (especially in terms of a 
project’s collective reputation or goodwill). Both of these will be elaborated on in turn. 
Firstly, the CAFC’s reasoning seems to be underlined by an assumption that FOSS 
programmers are simply motivated by ‘economic benefits’ brought to them by contributing to 
a FOSS project. In particular, it points out that programmers’ reputational gain can fall under 
these ‘economic benefits’: ‘a programmer or company may increase its national or 
international reputation by incubating open source projects.’104 This view is in tune with Eric 
Raymond’s economic interpretation of FOSS programmers’ motivation as driven by 
individual utility maximisation: The FOSS community is a bazaar-like market made up of ‘a 
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collection of selfish agents attempting to maximize utility which in the process produces a 
self-correcting spontaneous order’.105 What is unique about this FOSS bazaar is that money is 
not primarily used as a measure of programmers’ utility. Instead, FOSS programmers use 
‘reputational reward’ as an alternative, which is believed to play a similar ‘utility function’ as 
money.
106
 Under this logic, the more contribution is made by a programmer, the more 
reputational ‘utility’ can be generated to meet this creator’s economic aspiration. It is 
interesting to note that this utilitarian interpretation of reputational reward is present not just 
in Raymond’s writings, but is also accepted by some legal scholars who believe that highly 
skilled individuals including computer programmers can own their reputation as property. As 
Fisk comments: ‘If professional reputation were property, it would be the most valuable 
property that most people own.’107 
In contrast, the craftsmanship model is much more inclusive than CAFC’s exclusively 
economic approach when dealing with motivation. It believes that FOSS programmers are 
motivated by a multiplicity of incentives and not just by the economic utility from the 
reputational reward. Most importantly, as already mentioned, FOSS programmer-craftsmen 
are primarily motivated by their intrinsic satisfaction from doing the work well for its own 
sake. This craftsmanship theory of motivation has been corroborated by an important 
empirical survey conducted by Lakhani and Wolf showing that the leading motivation of 
FOSS programmers is indeed what Torvalds calls the skill-based ‘Entertainment with the 
capital E’ comprising the intrinsic pleasure from programming and the prospect of improving 
programming skills.
108 
Interestingly enough, the Raymondian reputational reward also exists 
according to the survey, but ranks relatively low in the list compared with the other 
motivational forces that are most commonly recognised by programmers themselves.
109
 
Furthermore, even though the reputational reward is not the exclusive top motivation for 
FOSS programmers, it can still work with (rather than against) the craftsmanship model that 
focuses on the quality of programmers’ codes. This is because FOSS projects with an 
effective attribution system can also use reputation as a quality measure of programmers’ 
work. Reputation as a quality measure suggests that reputation is not just a programmer’s 
private property, but that the programmer is under a responsibility for his reputation to be 
publicly assessed by peer programmers or software users. Weber finds that an individual 
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FOSS ‘author is too close to the work and needs external measures of quality in order to 
know whether the work is good and how to improve it’.110 In this sense, reputation is not just 
a proxy-measure for individual utility as assumed by Raymond, but is also a proxy-measure 
for the quality of code under the craftsmanship model: 
As is true of many technical and artistic disciplines, the quality of a programmer’s mind 
and work is not easy for others to judge in standardized metrics. To know what is really 
good code and thus to assess the talent of a particular programmer takes a reasonable 
investment of time. The best programmers, then, have a clear incentive to reduce the 
energy that it takes for others to see and understand just how good they are. […] The 
programmer participates in an open source project as a demonstrative act to show the 
quality of her work. Reputation within a well-informed and self-critical community 
becomes the most efficient proxy measure for that quality.
111
 
In addition to FOSS authors’ motivation, the second issue of ‘authorship as responsibility’ is 
about the responsibility of a core group of lead programmers to coordinate individual 
contributions into a whole FOSS project, which again is not adequately dealt with under the 
‘authorship as property’ model. When these lead programmers coordinate a certain project 
continuously over a long period, they should not only be credited for their individual 
contribution, but more significantly, also receive credit for their stewardship work that 
integrates other contributors’ submissions into a collective whole. In other words, instead of 
owning reputation as property, lead programmers are also shouldering authorial responsibility 
for taking care of the whole project under concern. To illustrate, Torvalds (as the leader of the 
Linux kernel) may claim two types of authorship for his work. On the one hand, he is the 
individual author of the code written by him; on the other hand, he is also the stewardship 
author who reviews, approves and integrates other people’s contribution into the mainline 
Linux kernel. The former is familiar to the Romantic mode of individuated authorship, while 
the latter is a less familiar one but is crucial to the success of a large-scale collaborative FOSS 
project. 
It is worth noting that individual authorship and ownership may substantially overlap in a 
small budding project in its early formative stage, when a main programmer’s individual 
contributions account for the greatest part of the program. At this stage, his significant 
individual authorship can easily give rise to project leadership, which is ‘essentially the same 
as ownership’ as observed by Weber.112 However, when the project is scaled up into a much 
larger one, the lead programmer’s individual authorship can be rapidly diluted to the extent 
that he can no longer justify his ownership/leadership of the whole program. If this 
programmer continues to be enthusiastic about taking the project forward, then the basis of 
his leadership must shift from an ever-dwindling ownership of the software to an 
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ever-increasing stewardship responsibility in coordinating other programmers’ contributions 
for the project. 
This shift from ownership to stewardship is significant to a rounded understanding of project 
leaders’ ‘authorship as responsibility’. Countering the Romantic assumption of self-inspired 
authorship, the responsibility of FOSS leaders in stewardship seems to flesh out Kwall’s 
thesis that conceptualises the ‘author as steward’.113 According to Kwall, there are two 
components in author-stewardship. The first comes from an awareness that an author himself 
is not the sole source of his creation. Instead, inspiration is externally endowed as a gift that 
enables the author to make his own creation.
114
 In other words, the author-steward is not 
self-inspired, but receives external inspiration as a gift in which certain unearned value is 
bestowed upon him.
 
In a large-scale FOSS project, it is clear that every programmer benefits 
from other people’s contribution, and no one can claim to be the sole source of the whole 
program. Even many founding members of projects try hard to avoid reinventing the wheel if 
there are existing technologies available for reuse. Linus Torvalds, for example, did not start 
the Linux kernel from scratch in 1992, but obtained inspiration from the pedagogical Minix 
system initially developed by the Amsterdam-based computer scientist Andrew Tanenbaum 
in the late 1970s. Similarly, Stallman did not start the Emacs editor in the early 1980s from 
nothing. Instead, the program has been co-developed since the 1970s by a few programmers 
at the MIT Lab. The second component of author-stewardship goes against rewarding creators 
with exclusive ownership right. Instead it evokes a sense of responsibility to offer the author’s 
work as a return gift back to the community from which the author gets his externally endowed 
inspiration in the first place. Or to put it in Kwall’s words, it is the author’s stewardship 
responsibility to participate in ‘the cyclical dimension of creative enterprise’.115 Hyde thinks 
that this responsibility actually comes from creators’ ‘labour of gratitude’ which spurs creators 
to do something reciprocal for the external inspiration that is bestowed upon them early on.
116
 
In the history of FOSS development, Richard Stallman is a model of a programmer with a 
strong sense of stewardship responsibility to offer his software back to the community. When 
Stallman started his GNU project in 1983 (two years before the advent of the first copyleft 
licence in 1985), his initial announcement of the project clearly indicated that he was driven by 
an ethical responsibility to share his software with the community: ‘I consider that the golden 
rule requires that if I like a program I must share it with other people who like it.’117 His later 
experiment with the copyleft agreement, which makes programmers contribute modifications 
or improvements back to the community, further institutionalises programmers’ stewardship 
responsibility through the mechanism of software licensing. Fusing the two components 
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together, author-stewardship manages to bring to the foreground the ‘responsibility’ element 
in the ‘authorship as responsibility’ model, and it significantly departs from the ‘authorship as 
property’ model, which believes that the solitary self-inspired genius needs to be rewarded 
with private ownership for their creative works. 
To summarise, the analysis of the legal persona of FOSS programmers above is quite different 
from that of their authorial persona in the previous section. The former is largely normative in 
the form of a proposal to build the craftsmanship element into a moral right regime independent 
from the property-oriented copyright, while the latter is predominantly descriptive in 
foregrounding the programmer-craftsmen’s traits from the historical context of the hacker 
tradition. In other words, the craftsmanship theory does not only excel in describing FOSS 
programmers’ authorial persona as craftspeople who are obsessed with  the quality of their 
work,  but it also has the potential in building a conceptual bridge towards programmers’ 
legal persona as constructed by corresponding licensing schemes calling for a limited moral 
right regime of authorial attribution. 
5. Conclusion 
This article has sought to understand the authorial persona of FOSS programmers as shaped 
by their licensing schemes. It has argued that neither the Romantic-author vision nor the 
postmodern authorless creativity is suitable for defining FOSS programmers’ authorial 
consciousness. Instead, it has found that Sennett’s ‘craftsmanship’ theory—which explains 
craftsmen’s intrinsic motive to do a job well for its own sake—is more adequate for 
addressing these programmers’ authorial personas. The craftsmanship persona is also 
reflected in the prevalent ‘attribution’ clause in FOSS licensing, which enables the peer 
assessment of the quality of programmers’ work associated with their reputation. However, 
current US copyright law does not statutorily recognise software programmers’ moral right of 
attribution, but effectively blurs the distinction between authors’ non-pecuniary moral rights 
and their economic rights as defined by the Berne Convention. It is proposed that FOSS 
authors’ legal persona should depart from the copyright ownership and be re-anchored in 
their author-stewardship of the relevant projects, which are taken care of under FOSS 
programmer-craftsmen’s authorial responsibility. 
 
